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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background 
One might think nuclear energy is a topic of the last century, but it is not. While a lot 
of developed countries, like Germany, have opted to phase out nuclear energy, other 
countries cling to their nuclear power plants, like France and the United States, and 
then again other countries want to enhance their nuclear potential, like South Africa. 
The last few months have shown that the topic is not out of date. The United States, 
in person of President Trump, decided to expand their engagement in the nuclear 
sector,
1
 while South Africa’s nuclear opponents celebrated the first national nuclear 
case ruling against nuclear energy,
2
 which in reality was not a ruling against the use 
of nuclear energy, but it shows the actuality of the topic. Furthermore, in Japan the 
first case started in court regarding the criminal liability of executive managers of 
Tepco for the Fukushima nuclear disaster six years after the accident.
3
 In the mean-
time, the German government closed a deal with the German energy providers about 
the future of the nuclear power plants, their reconstruction and their waste,
4
 as the 
last German nuclear power plant will be taken from the grid in 2022.
5
 
These few examples already show how diverse and current the discussion of the top-
ic nuclear energy is. The debate is also intensified by several scientific-scholars, who 
proclaim nuclear energy as a ‘clean energy’ in the days of climate change and GHG-
emission.
6
 However, the Kyoto Protocol excluded nuclear energy explicitly from its 
                                                 
1
 https://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/2017/Trump-Puts-Nuclear-First-on-
America-s-Energy-Agend accessed on 17 December 2017 
2
 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Energy 2017 (5) SA 227 (WCC) 
3
 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/30/fukushima-nuclear-crisis-tepco-criminal-
trial-japan accessed on 17 December 2017 
4
 http://www.manager-magazin.de/politik/deutschland/atomare-altlasten-regierung-und-
atomkonzerne-einig-ueber-entsorgung-a-1138070.html accessed on 19 December 2017 
5
 C Raetzke ‘Nuclear third party liability in Germany’ (2016) 97 Nuclear Law Bulletin 33; T Mann 
‘The legal status of nuclear power in Germany’ (2014) 94 Nuclear Law Bulletin 43 
6
 IAEA Climate Change and Nuclear Power (2016) 1-4; D Davies ‘The Convention on Supplemen-
tary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and participation by developing countries: A South African 
perspective’ (2014) 93 Nuclear Law Bulletin 25; WNA ‘Nuclear Power in the World Today’, August 
2017, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-
generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx accessed on 17 December 2017 
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The topic of nuclear energy is also very relevant in South Africa, as the government 
considers developing its nuclear power programme due to the fact that a lot of energy 
is needed in times of developing the country. Therefore, nuclear resources can pro-
vide cheap energy.
8
 South Africa currently has one nuclear power plant consisting of 
two reactors, both of which are operating in Koeberg in the Western Cape.
9
 
Due to this discussion the question arises what legal consequences a development of 
the nuclear sector will entail, especially the topic of nuclear liability. This term in-
cludes two categories, the liability of nuclear waste and the liability in the case of an 
accident, such as the nuclear disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima. The scope of the 
essay is limited to the latter one, nuclear liability in case of an accident. 
1.2 Relevance of the study 
As South Africa is seriously considering the expansion of nuclear energy, this study 
examines the questions arising in the context of nuclear liability from an internation-
al and domestic perspective. This is important, because South Africa should be aware 
of the consequences, which could be entailed by a larger engagement in the nuclear 
energy sector and the related increase of the risk of a nuclear accident. It is important 
to assess, if the current South African legal framework in terms of nuclear liability is 
sufficient and provide for enough security and compensation in case of an accident or 
if amendments to the legal framework should be considered. 
                                                 
7
 D Fig ‘Nuclear energy rethink? The rise and demise of South Africa’s Pebble Bed Modular Reactor’ 
(2010) 210 ISS Paper 2 
8
 The government plans to provide 9.6 GW in nuclear power from 2023 until 2030. See Department of 
Energy Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity Revision 2 (2010) available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%20files/INTEGRATED_RESOURCE_PLAN_ELECTRICITY_2010
_v8.pdf accessed on 17 December 2017 vii; Therefore, a contract was signed in September 2014 be-
tween the government of South Africa and Rosatom (the State Atomic Energy Corporation of Russia) 
about the building of new nuclear power plants. See WNA ‘Nuclear Power in South Africa’, Novem-
ber 2017, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-
s/south-africa.aspx accessed on 17 December 2017 
9
 WNA op cit (n8) 
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1.3 Key research question 
Due to these relevant assessment questions, the study will examine and compare the 
legislation in South Africa with international law and German law. Therefore the key 
research question of the study is: A critical assessment of the nuclear liability regime 
in South Africa against the backdrop of the international legal framework and lessons 
which can be learned by the case-study of the nuclear liability regime in Germany. 
1.4 Theoretical underpinning of the study 
Nuclear liability is the core of the legal system concerning nuclear energy, as nuclear 
energy is an ultra-hazardous energy resource which could cause huge damage to 
people, their property and the environment. It is crucial to have an effective and 
clearly regulated legal regime, which provides for answers in the case of a nuclear 
accident, such as who is responsible, who has to pay for damages, which damages 
are compensable. Therefore, the study will outline the principles and elements of 
nuclear liability on the basis of ordinary law of delict and will show how the ordinary 
principles are refined in the nuclear liability context, before comparing and assessing 
the international legal framework and the domestic legislations of Germany and 
South Africa. 
The study is therefore based on the analysis of primary legislation, which includes 
the relevant international conventions for nuclear liability and the relevant nuclear 
acts and further regulations from Germany and South Africa. As there have not been 
major nuclear accidents, where a claim for nuclear damage would have been possible 
under the discussed legal frameworks
10
 and the nuclear liability frameworks are 
mainly regulated on a statutory base, the study does rarely refer to case law. Where 
existing, the study uses secondary resources, like books, reports and especially jour-
nal articles, to analyse the primary legislation in more detail. The literature on nucle-
ar liability in regards to South Africa is thereby quite rare. 
                                                 
10
 Neither Russia, nor Japan have been a member to any international nuclear convention at the time 
of the Chernobyl accident and the Fukushima accident, WNA ‘Liability for Nuclear Damage’, June 
2017, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-
plants/liability-for-nuclear-damage.aspx accessed on 17 December 2017 
4 
1.5 Structure 
The study is dived into seven chapters. 
Having introduced the topic in this chapter, chapter 2 provides a short outline about 
the topic nuclear energy, including how nuclear energy production works and how 
the technology was developed in the last decades. It focuses on damages caused by a 
nuclear accident. 
Chapter 3 contains the international framework for nuclear liability. Therefore, it 
categorizes the notion of nuclear liability in regard of international responsibility in 
general. Afterwards it outlines the international principles of nuclear liability, which 
are also applicable in domestic law. It then focuses on the relevant conventions in the 
context of nuclear liability, by describing its functions and the relevant key articles. 
Chapter 4 provides a case study of the nuclear liability regime in Germany. While the 
country was one of the first countries producing nuclear energy, it is now in the pro-
cess of phasing out of it. It is interesting to look how Germany implemented the in-
ternational framework of nuclear liability and which lessons could be learned by 
South Africa for its own liability regime, as Germany has a very comprehensive nu-
clear liability legislation. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the current South African legal framework for nuclear energy 
and the liability for it. It examines how the country implemented the international 
provisions into domestic law, especially the National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 
1999. Furthermore, it compares the German and South African legal systems and 
provides suggestions how South Africa could improve its legislation for a more 
comprehensive and better balanced nuclear liability regime. 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion, which summarises the knowledge gained about 
nuclear liability in the different regimes and outlines the most important findings of 
the study.  
5 
Chapter 2 – Nuclear energy – a short summary 
2.1 Introduction 
The production of nuclear energy is a world-wide phenomenon. The first commercial 
nuclear power plants were established in the 1950s. Today, over 440 commercial 
nuclear power plants are operating in 31 countries with a total capacity of 390 GW 
and further 60 reactors are planned
 11
 Nuclear energy has a share of approximately 11 
percent of the world’s energy production.
12
 
South Africa is currently the only country in Africa, which produces nuclear energy 
through its two nuclear reactors in Koeberg.
13
 They have a capacity of 1.8 GW and 
produced 15.200 GWh of nuclear energy in 2016, which was 6.6 percent of the ener-
gy production in 2016.
14
 Eight new reactors with a capacity of 9.6 GW are planned.
15
 
In comparison, Germany produced 80.100 GWh in 2016 with its eight remaining 
generators with a total capacity of 10.7 GW. This was a share of 13.1 percent of the 
German energy production in 2016.
16
 Consequently, South Africa’s nuclear expan-
sion plans would result in a higher reactor capacity than Germany has today. 
In describing nuclear energy production, two nuclear processes can be distinguished, 
namely fission and fusion.
17
 In a nuclear fission process, energy is released when a 
heavy nucleus, normally a uranium or plutonium nucleus, is split into two smaller 
nuclei by hitting them with a neutron. The weight of the products of the fission is 
lighter than the initial nucleus.
18
 This lost matter is released in the form of energy.
19
 
The fission of the nucleus releases neutrons by itself, which lead to a chain reaction 
and the fission of further large nuclei and the release of further energy.
20
 The func-
                                                 
11




 WNA op cit (n8); Ghana is in the process of establishing a nuclear energy programme, IAEA Mis-
sion report on the integrated nuclear infrastructure review (INIR) – phase 1 Ghana (2017) available 
at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/review-missions/inir-mission-to-ghana-january-
2017.pdf accessed on 19 December 2017 5-6 
14
 http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-






 CD Ferguson Nuclear Energy What everyone needs to know (2011) 7 
18
 Ibid 10 
19
 D Fig Uranium Road Questioning South Africa’s Nuclear Direction (2005) 24 
20
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 23 
6 
tion of a reactor thereby is to control this chain reaction.
21
 All commercial nuclear 
power plants are operating on this process today.
22
 
In a nuclear fusion process, energy is released when two hydrogen atoms, melt into 
one heavier helium atom.
23
 This process occurs in the sun and produces its bright 
light. Although this kind of energy production would be of extraordinary interest, it 
is not yet possible to produce commercial energy through this process.
24
 
Despite nuclear energy being a profitable energy resource, its production also entails 
a lot of serious risks, which can be seen when looking at the previous three serious 
nuclear accidents. 
2.2 Three Mile Island accident 
The first relevant nuclear accident occurred on 28 March 1979 at Unit 2 of the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania in the USA, when 
the reactor partly melted down.
25
 Due to a number of technical and human failures 
the cooling system of the nuclear reactor failed, which resulted in the melting of 
about half of the nuclear fuel pellets.
26
 Although this is potentially the most danger-
ous kind of nuclear accident, the effects outside of the nuclear power plant remained 
small, because the reactor building stayed intact and thus kept most of the radioactive 
material within the building.
27
 Therefore, in accordance to several independent stud-
ies the accident had only negligible impacts on the health of human, animals and 
plants,
28
 whereby another independent study came to the result that the prevalence of 
cancer six years after the accident on the lee side of the nuclear power plant was sig-
nificantly higher than on the windward side, partly up to 150 percent.
29
 
                                                 
21
 Fig op cit (n19) 24 
22
 https://whatisnuclear.com/articles/nucenergy.html accessed on 17 December 2017 
23
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 11-12 
24
 https://whatisnuclear.com/articles/nucenergy.html accessed on 17 December 2017 
25
 U.S.NRC ‘Three Mile Island Accident’, February 2013, available at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-






 Ibid 2 
29
 S Wing et al. ‘A Reevaluation of the Cancer Incidence near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant: 
The Collision of Evidence and Assumptions’ (1997) 105 Environmental Health Perspectives 55, 57 
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However, the biggest effect of the accident, beside huge financial costs for clean-up 
and the loss of the revenue of the reactor,
30
 was the newly ignited debate about nu-
clear energy in the USA, which reputedly enhanced the security of nuclear reactors 
in the USA.
31
 After a clean-up of 14 years with the costs amounting to US Dollar 1 
billion,
32
 the reactor in Unit 2 is permanently shut down today.
33
 
2.3 Chernobyl accident 
The nuclear accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine was the worst 
accident the world has ever experienced and it had a pervasive impact on the evolu-
tion of international nuclear liability law.
34
 It also had serious harmful impacts on 
human health and the natural environment, not only in the Ukraine, but also in its 
neighbouring countries.
35
 On 26 April 1986 the operator simulated a blackout to test 
its security features.
36
 Caused by serious disregard of safety regulations and special 
design characteristics of the reactor, an uncontrolled power increase occurred. This 
finally led to the explosion of the reactor in Unit 4 and destroyed the roof of the reac-
tor building.
37
 Hereafter a fire broke out. Especially the graphite, which was used as 
a moderator in the reactor, started burning. Due to these circumstances, the firefight-
ers on the site incurred a lot of radiation, which cost the lives of 31 of them.
38
 
Furthermore, large amounts of radioactive substances were released into the atmos-
phere. The scope of the accident spread out over the whole northern hemisphere. 
People in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia, who experienced health and socio-
                                                 
30
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 148 
31
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 149; U.S.NRC op cit (n25) 1 
32
 http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/15/us/14-year-cleanup-at-three-mile-island-concludes.html ac-
cessed on 18 November 2017 
33
 U.S.NRC op cit (n25) 4 
34
 JA Schwartz ‘International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to Chernobyl’ in NEA 
& IAEA International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period (2006) 37; Ferguson op cit (n17) 
149 
35
 Schwartz op cit (n34) 37 
36
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 149-151 
37
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 149-151; NEA Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts 
(2002) available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/pubs/2003/3508-chernobyl.pdf accessed on 17 De-
cember 2017 28 
38
 NEA op cit (n37) 29 
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economic impacts, caused by the radiation were the most affected victims.
39
 Today, 
about five million people still live in radioactive contaminated areas.
40
 
Besides the 31 people, who died as an acute result of the accident, 237 people were 
diagnosed to suffer from radiation sickness.
41
 Regarding the long term impacts of the 
accident, a significant increase of thyroid cancer, especially among children, was 




Furthermore, about 135.000 people had to be evacuated within a 30 kilometre radius, 
mostly from the nearby town of Pripyat, which is still uninhabited today.
43
 The acci-
dent had detrimental effects on agriculture and environment. About 200.000 km
2
 of 
agricultural land in the nearby area was contaminated by the accident with radiation 
and large amounts of food products had to be destroyed.
44
 In the following, bans and 
restrictions on food products were put in place and are partly still in place today.
45
 
Several agricultural farms in other parts of Europe were subject to these restrictions, 
as they also experienced impacts of the accident.
46
 Additionally, the natural envi-
ronment was affected. Natural products, like fish, mushrooms, berries and game meat 
are still suffering from radiation and the contamination of groundwater in the Cher-
nobyl area could also become an issue in the future.
47
 The estimated total costs for 
the accident have been calculated to be hundreds of billion US dollars.
48
  
2.4 Fukushima accident 
On 11 March 2011, a massive earthquake (9.0 on the Richter scale) rocked the 
Miyagi Prefecture coast in Japan. It triggered a devastating tsunami which attacked 
                                                 
39




 NEA op cit (n37) 78-79; Schwartz op cit (n34) 37 
42
 NEA op cit (n37) 81; Schwartz op cit (n34) 37; Ferguson op cit (n17) 151 
43
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 151-152; Schwartz op cit (n34) 37 
44
 Schwartz op cit (n34) 37; NEA op cit (n37) 100 
45
 Schwartz op cit (n34) 37 
46




 Ferguson op cit (n17) 152; Schwartz op cit (n34) 38 
9 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
49
 Although the shutdown operations 
were implemented correctly, the cooling system failed due to the flooding of the 
emergency diesel generators.
50
 The following overheating of the reactor’s core and 
different chemical reactions, mainly between zirconium and water, caused the for-
mation of hydrogen gas. This entailed gas explosions, which damaged the reactor 
buildings.
51
 Despite the fact that in contrast to the Chernobyl accident, the core reac-
tors were not damaged,
52
 huge amounts of radioactive material, mostly in gas-form, 
were released in the atmosphere but also into the Pacific Ocean.
53
 According to re-
ports, the reactor units 1-3 released radioactive materials of an amount 168.5 times 
that of the Hiroshima atomic bomb.
54
 The accident was classified as a level seven 
incident, equal to the Chernobyl accident, which is the highest level on the Interna-
tional Nuclear Event Scale.
55
 It was significant for this accident that more than one 
reactor was involved, while the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl accident were 
limited to one reactor.
56
 
The extent of damage caused by the Fukushima accident cannot be conclusively 
measured today. Nevertheless, 80.000 people had to be evacuated in a radius of 20 
km
57
 and food product restrictions were put in place.
58
 Despite the fact that the Fuku-
shima accident entailed consequences not as bad as the Chernobyl accident, a signifi-
cant increase of radiation in all relevant biota could be measured,
59
 including Europe 
and North America.
60
 Furthermore, an increase of non-radiation related diseases, 
such as anxiety, posttraumatic stress and depression had been noted subsequently to 
                                                 
49
 C-K Kim et al. ‘Radiological impact in Korea following the Fukushima nuclear accident’ (2011) 
111 Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 70; G Steinhauser et al. ‘Comparison of the Chernobyl 
and Fukushima nuclear accidents: A review of the environmental impacts’ (2014) 470-471 Science of 
the Total Environment 801 
50
 Ferguson op cit (n17) 164 
51




 Y Kim et al. ‘Effect of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on global public acceptance of nuclear ener-
gy’ (2013) 61 Energy Policy 822; Ferguson op cit (n17) 165-166; Kim et al. op cit (n49) 70 
54




 Ferguson op cit (n17) 167 
57
 Kim et al. op cit (n53) 822 
58













The accidents illustrate the serious detrimental impacts, which nuclear accidents can 
have and the consequences they could entail on human health and safety, the envi-
ronment including animals and plants, as well as the huge clean-up costs. These po-
tential risks must always be born in mind, when talking about the presumably attrac-
tive resource nuclear energy. Furthermore, especially after the Chernobyl accident, 
the world community recognized the dimension of nuclear disasters and its trans-
boundary character, which strengthened the pressure to improve the international 
regulations.
63
 The evolution of the international framework and its responses to the 
Chernobyl accident will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
  
                                                 
61
 Steinhauser et al op cit (n45) 814 
62
 https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima accessed on 20 November 2017 
63
 Schwartz op cit (n34) 38 
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Chapter 3 – Nuclear liability in the context of international law 
3.1 Introduction 
As seen above, nuclear energy is a valuable energy resource. Although there was a 
great enthusiasm for this technique from the beginning, the persons responsible rec-
ognized early, that it would involve hazards, which could not be compared to con-
ventional risks, because of the potential extent of the damage and its particular char-
acteristics.
64
 The global community recognized that there was a crucial need for pub-
lic safeguards in order to be prepared for the case of a nuclear accident, if one made 
extensive use of nuclear energy.
65
 It was admitted that it is not possible to create a 
completely safe reactor: ‘We must recognise that the only way to be absolutely safe 
is not to build a reactor at all.’
66
 The Chernobyl accident illustrated these concerns 
painfully and showed the extent of damage, which could be caused by a nuclear inci-
dent.
67
 Due to these facts it was indispensable to establish a legal system which deals 
on the one hand with safety standards and the conduct in case of an accident and on 
the other hand with the liability for damages caused by an accident.
68
 As the scope of 
the study is limited to the latter topic, the international law will be only discussed 
regarding the international nuclear liability instruments.
69
 The chapter will introduce 
the notion of nuclear liability by contextualising it within the wider topic of interna-
tional responsibility. Afterwards it will outline the general principles of nuclear lia-
bility and discuss the relevant international conventions. 
3.2 Nuclear liability in the context of international responsibility 
To get a better understanding of nuclear liability, the study will outline the special 
features of the notion in the context of international responsibility. Therefore, it will 
outline the traditional concept of international responsibility – state responsibility – 
and will show why this concept does not fit for high risk and hazardous, yet lawful 
                                                 
64
 V Boulanenkov & B Brands ‘Nuclear Liability: Status and Prospects’ (1988) 4 IAEA Bulletin 5 
65
 MJL Hardy ‘Nuclear Liability: The general principles of law and further proposals’ (1960) 36 Brit-
ish Yearbook of International Law 224 
66
 CG McCullough, Chairman of the United States Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety, in Atomic 
Industrial Forum Management economics and technology for the atomic industry: proceedings of the 
annual conference for members and guests, Sept. 25-27, 1956, Morrison Hotel, Chicago (1956) 173 
67
 see chapter 2.3 
68
 C Stoiber et al. Handbook on Nuclear Law (2003) 107 
69
 for an overview about the conventions and codes concerning nuclear safety and emergency cases, 
see http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/default.asp?s=6&l=44 accessed on 17 December 2017 
12 
activities, such as the production of nuclear energy is one. Afterwards, it will intro-
duce the alternative concept of civil liability and how the nuclear liability regime is 
embedded in this framework. 
3.2.1 The traditional definition of international responsibility 
Responsibility is a core element of international law and interacts strongly with the 
concept of sovereignty.
70
 The obligation to provide reparation for damage is an im-
manent part of the Law of Nature and the very basis of the notion of international 
responsibility.
71
 In other words, ‘it is a principle of law, and even a general concep-
tion of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make repara-
tion.’
72
 This approach means that for every breach of international law, which has 
caused damages, compensation must be provided.
73
 While states are generally the 
subject of international provisions and therefore the responsible entity, claims for 
compensation are only applicable in an inter-state relation.
74
 This sole inter-state 
relation is expressed by the term state responsibility. It deals with the accountability 
of states in the case of the breach of obligations applicable to and binding on the state 
under international law.
75
 In relation to these breaches, claims between states are 
normally brought directly before an international court or tribunal. This also means 




Furthermore, the international law does not distinguish if the breach is part of the law 
of contract, delict or criminal law.
77
 This is expressed by the judgement of the arbi-
tral tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case as 
‘the general principles of International Law concerning State responsibility 
are equally applicable in the case of breach of treaty obligation, since in the 
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international law field there is no distinction between contractual and tortious 
responsibility, so that any violation of a State of any obligation, of whatever 
origin gives rise to State responsibility.’
78
 
The reason for such a single approach is that in contrast to national law, the interna-
tional rules have to address a vast range of concerns and needs on the basis of only 
few tools and regulations. Hence international treaties often cover a wide range of 
functions, such as legislative and contractual issues.
79
  
A further deficit arises, when it comes to liability for harmful consequences of lawful 
activities.
80
 The concept of state liability does not fit in this context. Due to the re-
quirement of fault, a state cannot be held liable for unforeseeable or unavoidable 
damages caused by lawful activities of the private sector.
81
 For states to be held lia-
ble under these circumstances, the principle of fault would have to be abrogated in 
this context. However, this would undermine the ‘polluter pays’ principle (Principle 




 Therefore, state 
responsibility is not suited to address global environmental liability issues.
84
 Instead, 
a direct liability of the company which caused the pollution and damage would satis-
fy a ‘polluter pays’ approach.
85
 
Nevertheless, the international community fostered the development of international 
state liability regimes through the International Law Commission (ILC),
86
 although 
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these approaches were not successful.
87
 The former idea of creating an overarching 
concept of state liability was reduced to the discussion of ‘allocation of loss’.
88
 The 
Special Rapporteur for the topic finally recommended focusing on the development 
of civil liability instead of state liability.
89
 Even the sole attempt so far to create an 
overarching regime for civil liability, the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment
90
, was not success-
ful at all
91




Due to these conceptual deficits state responsibility does not play a practical role in 
the context of liability for environmental damages and its potential continues to be 
limited.
93
 Until today the international law does not provide any overarching rules for 
harmful consequences of lawful, non-prohibited activities.
94
 
3.2.2 Civil liability regimes 
Due to the stated deficits, an alternative approach, namely civil liability, was simul-
taneously developed for specific, ultra-hazardous and high-risk activities since the 
1960s, such as for maritime transport of oil or the use of nuclear energy.
95
 The re-
gimes aim to harmonize national legislation concerning liability of private entities,
96
 
which seems to be a better fitting and more efficient approach for the liability of is-
sue-specific harmful activities,
97
 as they channel liability and costs to the operator 
and allow victims to bring claims to court.
98
 Their main goal is, on the one hand, to 
facilitate the assert of claims for compensation of pollution damages caused by activ-
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ities, which entail a particular risk of hazardous damage, even when they are under-
taken with all due care.
99
 On the other hand, the regimes aim to protect operators 
from the risk of excessive claims, which would make it impossible for them to carry 
out these kinds of activities.
100
 In general, all civil liability regimes follow a similar 
approach and include several main elements, ‘which  
(1) define the activities or substances covered;  
(2) define the damage (to persons, property and the environment);  
(3) channel liability;  
(4) establish a standard of care (usually strict liability);  
(5) provide for liability amounts;  
(6) allow exonerations;  
(7) require the maintenance of adequate insurance or other financial security; 
(8) identify a court or tribunal to receive the claims; and  
(9) provide for the recognition and enforcement of judgments.’
101
 
In the meantime international treaties had been already adopted concerning damages 
caused by hazardous substances and wastes
102
, living modified organisms
103
 and en-
vironmental damages caused by certain dangerous activities.
104
 
3.2.3 The nuclear liability regime 
The international convention system concerned with nuclear liability could be in 
general classified as a civil liability regime.
105
 It channels the liability to the operator, 
thus a private entity, and aims to harmonize the national legislation for nuclear liabil-
ity including transboundary damage.
106
 However, the nuclear liability regime is not 
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solely based on civil liability aspects, it rather also enshrines elements of state re-
sponsibility.
107
 Insofar it includes provisions regarding the state as the guarantor for 
the strict liability of the operator and partly stipulates the obligation of additional 
compensation funds,
108
 which are classified as state responsibility elements.
109
 De-
spite the fact that this inclusion does not satisfy the ‘polluter-pays’ principle in 
full,
110
 the combination of both systems is important in favour of an effective liability 
regime. The influence of state responsibility will be outlined during the study where 
it is significant. 
3.3 International legal framework of nuclear liability 
As seen in chapter 1 the study will focus on the civil liability aspect of nuclear ener-
gy, thus the international legal context will only be covered in relation to the civil 
liability aspects. The first time regulations dealing with nuclear incidents can be 
found is in the domestic US legislation in the 1957 Price Anderson amendment to the 
1954 Atomic Energy Act, which can be seen as the foundation of nuclear third party 
liability.
111
 Not only the US government was concerned about nuclear incidents, but 
also the international community was discussing an international legal framework 
concerning nuclear incidents, as detrimental effects of nuclear accidents would not 
stop at state borders.
112
 Due to this potential transboundary character of nuclear dam-
age, the need of an international nuclear liability regime was early recognized.
113
 
This finally led to the adoption of the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy
114
 (Paris Convention), followed by a range of conven-
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 This chapter will introduce this convention system, after having outlined the 
general principles of nuclear liability. 
3.3.1 Principles of nuclear liability in the international legal framework 
Despite the fact that there are several international legal regimes for nuclear liability, 
they are all based on the same ideas and follow certain principles. The principles 
were developed and established on the basis of two facts.
116
 First, the international 
community recognized that the public must be protected against the potential risks of 
nuclear activities, which are much higher than the risks of conventional industries.
117
 
Second, it was realised that not only must the public be protected, but also the owner, 
operators, builders and suppliers of nuclear power plants. If the liability were poten-
tially unlimited, they would be in danger of insolvency, which would endanger the 
development of the nuclear industry.
118
 Due to these facts the international communi-
ty thought to solve this conflict by eliminating the legal and financial obstacles to the 
nuclear industry, while guaranteeing adequate compensation for damage of third par-
ties.
119
 These objectives can be also read from the preamble of the Paris Convention, 
which aims to ensure 
‘adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused 
by nuclear incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the de-
velopment of the production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
is not thereby hindered.’
120
 
Fulfilling these objectives also meant to modify the rules of conventional law of de-
lict (tort law).
121
 They are oriented to inhibit the compensation of victims in the con-
text of conventional industrial risks and provide therefore unlimited liability amounts 
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for unlimited periods of time.
122
 This makes them not appropriate to bring the out-
lined objectives in balance.
123
 
3.3.1.1 Strict liability 
The operator
124
 of a nuclear installation
125
 is strictly liable for all damage to third 
parties
126
 caused by a nuclear incident
127
 of its nuclear installation or during the 
transport of nuclear material from or to its nuclear installation. Strict liability entails 
the fact that a claimant is not obliged to prove fault or negligence of the operator; the 
operator is also liable without fault or negligence on its part.
128
 The mere existence of 
causality between the nuclear incident and the caused damage is enough for the oper-
ator’s liability.
129
 As the majority of people have no idea about the technical occur-
rences in case of an accident, the strict liability regime provides a relief for claimants 
in achieving their rights.
130
 
The strict liability approach contrasts the ordinary law of delict, where it is crucial to 
proof fault or negligence, although the idea of strict liability is common in other 
specified areas of the law of delict.
131
 
3.3.1.2 Exclusive liability 
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Furthermore, an operator is also exclusively liable for damage to third parties caused 
by a nuclear incident in its nuclear installation or even during the transport of nuclear 
substances from or to its installation.
132
 That means the operator is liable regardless 
of whose act caused the accident and even its carriers are spared of liability.
133
 The 
reason why is that otherwise suppliers would have to maintain an additional costly 
insurance for the liability, which would be a massive amount of entities.
134
 The ad-
vantage for victims is that they do not have to identify the accountable person, as this 




This is also a special feature compared to the ordinary law of delict, as there normal-
ly the acting party must be held liable, although there are some exceptions, for ex-
ample, where employers are accountable for their employees or where an ordering 
customer could be held liable for his supplier in specific circumstances.
136
 
3.3.1.3 Exonerations of liability 
Due to the strict and exclusive liability, several kinds of exonerations are provided. 
They normally include these circumstances: the nuclear accident was a direct result 
of an armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection.
137
 Exonerations are also 
applicable in cases in which the victims contributed to the nuclear accident through 
gross negligence or intent.
138
 
3.3.1.4 Limited liability in amount 
The limitation of the liability of the operator in amount is an important principle, 
which is a real advantage for the operator.
139
 As governments wanted to encourage 
the nuclear industry, they relieved them from potentially ruinous liability claims in 
case of a nuclear incident.
140
 The limitation of amount can be seen as equalization for 
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the benefits the victims gained from strict and exclusive liability of the operator.
141
 
The amount of liability and compensation is determined by each convention and has 
always been a major issue in the debates leading to the conventions.
142
 
In addition, most governments provide a supplementary financial fund, because they 
recognise that in case of a major incident the insurances of the operator will not cov-
er all damages. This can be seen as some kind of state responsibility in the predomi-
nant system of civil liability.
143
 
3.3.1.5 Financially secured liability 
As intimated above, operators of nuclear installations are obliged to maintain finan-
cial security insurances covering their liability amount for nuclear damage.
144
 This 
congruence principle ensures the ability of the operator to provide compensation in 
case of an incident.
145
 Usually, insurances are provided by the private sector, but 
alternative concepts are also possible, such as state or bank provided guarantees, op-
erator pooling systems or self-insurance (normally only permitted when nuclear in-
stallation is owned or operated by the state).
146
 
3.3.1.6 Limited liability in time 
Due to the fact that insurance providers clarified that their financial coverage must be 
limited in time, the liability of nuclear operators is also limited in time.
147
 Claims 
must be normally submitted within ten years from the date of the nuclear incident for 
property damages and personal injury,
148
 in deviation of ordinary law of delict, 
which stipulates a time limit of 30 years.
149
 However, recently the time limit for per-
sonal injury was extended to 30 years in the international convention system.
150
 Fur-
thermore, several jurisdictions include a ‘discovery rule’, which means, that victims 
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must claim for damages within two or three years after they received notice of the 
damage for which they can claim compensation.
151
 
3.3.1.7 Non-discrimination rule 
A further principle stipulates that the conventions and the domestic law must be ap-
plicable, irrespective of the nationality, domicile or residence.
152
 This ensures that 
victims suffering damage in a state other than the accident state benefit from the 




In case of a nuclear accident, the jurisdiction of many courts would arise due to gen-
eral procedural law.
154
 Therefore, international conventions stipulate, on the one 
hand, that the courts of the country in which the nuclear accident occurred have ex-
clusive jurisdiction, and on the other hand, that states have to ensure that only one 




These principles are the basis of the international legal framework for nuclear liabil-
ity, but as the international regime harmonizes the domestic legislation of the con-
tracting states, they are also part of the national nuclear liability regimes, which will 
be outlined in chapter 4 and 5. 
3.3.2 Convention system 
There is a whole system of treaties and protocols, which deal with the topic of civil 
nuclear liability; hence it is important to provide an overview of the different regimes 
before going into the details. In brief, there are four international conventions which 
provide a special regime for civil liability of nuclear liability. Firstly, the 1960 Con-
vention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
156
 (Paris Conven-
tion), which covers nuclear incidents in Western Europe overseen by the OECD Nu-
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 (NEA) and to which all Western European nuclear states are 
party.
158
 The Paris Convention is complemented by the 1963 Convention Supple-
mentary to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
159
 
(Brussels Convention), to which a state can only become party, if it has signed the 
Paris Convention. The Brussels Convention provides additional financial compensa-
tions for victims.
160
 Secondly, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage
161
 (Vienna Convention) was adopted under the auspices of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
162
 (IAEA) and provides an international system 
for global participation based on the same principles as the Paris Convention.
163
 
Thirdly, in response to the Chernobyl accident the 1988 Joint Protocol on the appli-
cation of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
164
 (Joint Protocol) was 
established to link both conventions.
165
 Finally, coupled with certain revisions to the 
Vienna Convention through the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
166
 (VC Protocol), the 1997 Convention on Sup-
plementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
167
 (Convention on Supplementary 
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Compensation) was adopted to encourage the participation of Eastern European nu-
clear countries and especially Russia in the international liability regime.
168
 These 
four conventions and selected amendments to the Paris Convention and the Vienna 
Convention are presented in detail. The study will introduce them in a chronological 
way, as it is the easiest way to understand them and the development of the nuclear 
liability regime. 
There are two more treaties related to the topic of nuclear liability. The first one 
deals with nuclear ships
169
 and the second one with maritime carriage of nuclear ma-
terials.
170
 As the scope of the study includes only the general framework for nuclear 
liability of nuclear installations and the conventions are only barely ratified, the study 
will not further deal with them. 
3.3.2.1 Paris Convention
171
 and Vienna Convention
172
 
As stated above, the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention are quite similar in 
their regulations and aims, therefore the study will examine them together. The Paris 
Convention will be discussed in its version amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 
January 1964
173
 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982.
174
 This version of the 
Paris Convention
175
 has been in force since 7 October 1988.
176
 The 2004 Protocol to 
Amend the Paris Convention
177
 (PC Protocol) and the corresponding 2004 Protocol 
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to Amend the Brussels Convention
178
 (BC Protocol) will be discussed separately, as 
they are not yet in force.
179
 The Vienna Convention will be examined in its original 
version of 21 May 1963, which entered into force on 12 November 1977.
180
 As both 
Conventions were already amended by several protocols, the study will only have a 
brief look on these regimes. 
Both conventions provide strict and exclusive liability of the operator, regardless of 
its legal status – a private entity or the state –, for damages of accidents occurring at 
the installation or during the transport of nuclear substances to or from the installa-
tion.
181
 Compensation must be only provided for personal injury and damage to or 
loss of property other than the nuclear installation.
182
 Exonerations are possible in 
both conventions, but they are different. The Vienna Convention provides the possi-
bility of exoneration of the operator in case of a serious negligence of one of the per-
sons who are victims of the incident.
183
 Such a provision is not contained in the Paris 
Convention.
184
 Nonetheless, both conventions stipulate exonerations in case of an 
incident as a direct consequence of an armed conflict, hostilities, war, riot or natural 
disasters of exceptional character (the latter one was later excluded by the Amending 
Protocols of both Conventions).
185
 
Although the liability of the operator is strict, it is limited in time and amount.
186
 
Both conventions require that claims of compensation for damages must be launched 
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within ten years of the date of the incident.
187
 This is quite interesting, as it is shorter 
than in normal domestic legislations (30 years).
188
 Furthermore, they provide a ‘dis-
covery rule’, which means that claims must be brought to court within two / three 
years of the time the victims recognised the damage.
189
 
Despite the fact that both conventions stipulate limited liability,
190
 they are differ-
ences between the two conventions regarding the amount of liability. The Paris Con-
vention determines the maximum liability amount of the operator at SDR 15 mil-
lion
191
 and the minimum amount at SDR 5 million.
192
 The Vienna Convention only 
fixes a minimum amount of US Dollar 5 million.
193
 The member states of the Paris 
Convention recognised early that the limits of liability would not be adequate in rela-
tion to damages, which can be caused by a nuclear incident. In order to exceed the 
limit of compensation, the Brussels Convention was adopted to provide additional 
compensation.
194
 The Convention is based on a 3-tier system, which means that 
compensation is provided through three different funds.
195
 Compensation is provided 
on a first level through the funds of the operator (up to SDR 5 million),
196
 followed 
by public funds of the contracting states (up to SDR 175 million)
197
 and finally an 
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In terms of jurisdiction, both conventions state the principle that the courts of the 




The Paris Convention only applies to incidents in the territory of a Contraction 
State,
200
 while the text of the Vienna Convention is not clear about this fact and can 




Consequently, the comparison of the two main tools of the international nuclear lia-
bility regime reveals the general principles of nuclear liability and shows the simi-




This similarity and impracticability of the two parallel convention systems were also 
recognised by the international community. As a first, fairly quick, response to the 
Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Joint Protocol was adopted on 21 September 1988 
and entered into force on 27 April 1992.
203
 Before the adoption of the Joint Protocol, 
victims in member states of the particular convention could benefit from incidents 
happened in one of the contracting states of its convention, but were not able to claim 




Consequently, the main objective of the Joint Protocol was to outline the victim’s 
right to claim for compensation in any member state, irrespectively to which of the 
two conventions the state is a member.
205
 The Joint Protocol is also applicable to all 
                                                 
199
 article 13(1) Paris Convention; article XI(1) Vienna Convention; Montjoie op cit (n94) 927 
200
 article 2 Paris Convention 
201
 Montjoie op cit (n94) 922; other opinion Schwartz op cit (n34) 43, who states that the Vienna Con-
vention is also not applicable in the territory of a non-contracting state 
202
 The Joint Protocol has currently 28 contracting states. See https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/multilateral-agreements/joint-protocol-application-vienna-convention-paris-
convention.html accessed on 19 December 2017 
203
 Montjoie op cit (n94) 919 
204
 Schwartz op cit (n34) 44 
205
 Montjoie op cit (n94) 919 
27 
future amendments of the two conventions.
206
 In fact, the geographical coverage of 
nuclear liability was extended.
207
 With regard to the Chernobyl accident, the inten-
tion was also that the extended application would engage further countries to join the 
international liability system, especially in East Europe. This would extent the nucle-
ar liability system throughout Europe and would prevent that for accidents like Cher-
nobyl no compensation was provided.
208
 However, the result must be seen as disap-
pointing, because only a few states were attracted by the Joint Protocol and the idea 






Despite the lack of compensation following the Chernobyl disaster, the accident also 
showed the dimension of damage which could be caused by a nuclear incident.
211
 
The international community had to recognise that more financial compensation 
needed to be provided and compensation should be available for a larger number of 
people.
212
 As the Joint Protocol could only contribute to the second goal, a ‘further 
strengthening of the liability regime for nuclear damage [was] essential to the devel-
opment and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.’
213
 Due to these facts the 
VC Protocol was adopted on 12 September 1997 and entered into force on 4 October 
2003.
214
 It was the most noteworthy development in the context of nuclear liability 
law for decades, as it extended the amount of available money, the circle of people 
and the kind of damage which would be compensated.
215
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First of all, the VC Protocol increased the minimum amount of liability from US 
Dollar 5 million to SDR 300 million.
216
 The liability of the operation can be reduced 
to SDR 150 million, when in return the respective contracting state provides a public 
fund with the same additional amount.
217
 However, the protocol stipulates a transi-
tional period of 15 years starting at the date of the entry into force, where the mini-
mum amount of liability is fixed at SDR 100 million.
218
 The protocol does not ear-




The installation of a public fund could be seen as some kind of state liability. The 
need for which was also considered in the negotiations for the VC Protocol, as it was 
thought that only the financial resources of states would be able to provide enough 
compensation for accidents like Chernobyl.
220
 In the end, the idea was rejected in 




The VC Protocol also clarifies the applicability of the Vienna Convention, as it states 





 This means, more people can invoke the Vienna Convention 
in terms of compensation.
224
 In addition, the VC Protocol gives victims more time to 
claim compensation for loss of life or personal injury by extending the time limit 
from ten years to 30 years.
225
 Furthermore, it expands the competence of the jurisdic-
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Another fact, which was recognised after the Chernobyl accident, was the huge dam-
age to the environment and the costs to rehabilitate it.
227
 Thus the definition of nucle-
ar damage was refined and extended,
228
 by including several new types of damage, 
such as ‘the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment’,
229
 ‘the 
costs for preventive measures’,
230




Although it was hoped that the VC Protocol would encourage further states to join 
the nuclear liability regime or just enhance their liability position of the Vienna Con-
vention through signing and ratifying the protocol, the success of the attempt is min-




3.3.2.4 Convention on Supplementary Compensation
233
 
A further achievement was the adoption of the Convention on Supplementary Com-
pensation, which in the views of some scholars opened ‘a new chapter in internation-
al nuclear liability law.’
234
 The reason is the fact that the Convention on Supplemen-
tary Compensation deals with liability and compensation in a global context, which 
includes all nuclear energy operating countries as well as countries, which do not 
generate nuclear energy at all.
235
 The convention is a free-standing set of rules open 
to all states.
236
 It imposes mandatory contributions and is applicable to both, trans-
boundary damage and damage suffered within the state of a potential accident.
237
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Although it was adopted together with the VC Protocol on 12 September 1997, it 
only entered into force recently on 15 April 2015.
238
 
The convention is open to all states, regardless of their adherence to the Paris or Vi-
enna Convention.
239
 However, if they are not party to any of these conventions, the 
national legislation must be in line with the principles of the two conventions.
240
 This 
should allow the compensation of more people.
241
 
The convention is based on a 2-tier system to make more money available for com-
pensation.
242
 In a first step, the availability of at least SDR 300 million SDR
243
 must 
be provided, either by the nuclear operator, the nuclear installation state or by a com-
bination of both.
244
 The second tier is allocated by an international fund, established 
through the convention and to which all contracting states have to contribute in case 
that the damage to be compensated, exceeds the amount provided by the installation 
state.
245
 The compensation should be distributed without any discrimination.
246
 An 
interesting feature is the allocation of the fund. While half of its amount shall be al-
located for victims in and outside the installation state, the other half shall only be 
available for victims outside the installation.
247
 This 50-50 rule is a new innovation 
in nuclear liability law and has been welcomed by several scholars.
248
 
The approach of a broader understanding of nuclear damage, including environmen-
tal damage, was also set out in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation, 
which was adopted together with the VC Protocol. Insofar the terms ‘nuclear dam-
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The Convention on Supplementary Compensation was intended to attract further 
countries to join the nuclear liability regime, especially countries, which have not 
been party to any of the two already established systems. However, the success was 
not that great with only a few contracting states.
250
 Nevertheless, in the last years 
important nuclear generating states, such as the United States, Canada and India be-
came party to the Convention.
251
 
3.3.2.5 PC Protocol and BC Protocol 
The last relevant international treaties are the protocols to amend the Paris Conven-
tion and the Brussels Convention. Caused by the far reaching amendments of the VC 
Protocol, which would also have an impact on the Paris regime through the Joint 
Protocol, the Paris regime had to be amended as well.
252
 The intention of the proto-
cols, similar to the VC Protocol and the Convention on Supplementary Compensa-
tion, was to extent the scope of the conventions in terms of the amount of available 




3.3.2.5.1 PC Protocol 
The mentioned aims were realised by increasing the minimum liability amount to 
EUR 700 million
254
 in general, for low risk nuclear installation to EUR 70 million
255
 
and for transport to EUR 80 million.
256
 That is exceptional, as it nearly doubles the 
minimum amount of the VC Protocol and further does not make provisions for a lim-
it of liability. This makes it more compatible with states, which have already im-
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posed unlimited liability on their nuclear operator (like Germany).
257
 Financial secu-
rity is still required by the nuclear operators, at least the applicable minimum liability 
amount, and contracting states have to secure payment for claims, which exceed the 
maximum liability amount of their nuclear operators.
258
 A further improvement is the 
expansion of the scope of the Paris Convention. Originally, compensation was lim-
ited to the territory of the contracting states, with a few exceptions.
259
 The revised 
Paris Convention is now applicable to a whole range of further countries.
260
 Besides 
contracting states of the Vienna regime and the Joint Protocol, it also includes coun-
tries without nuclear installations or countries with a sufficient national legislation.
261
 
The prescription period for compensation claims for damage respecting personal 
injury or death is extended to 30 years.
262
 Finally, the revised Paris Convention now 
includes a definition of ‘nuclear damage’, similar to the definitions in the VC Proto-
col and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation.
263
 
3.3.2.5.2 BC Protocol 
The BC Protocol does not change the three-tier compensation system of the Brussels 
Convention, but increases the liability amounts of each stage significantly.
264
 Mini-
mum liability is increased on the first tier to EUR 700 million, on the second tier to 
EUR 500 million and on the third tier to EUR 300 million,
265
 which raises the total 
amount available for compensation to EUR 1.5 billion.
266
 However, the revised 
Brussels Convention remains applicable only in the territory of contracting states, 
even if its scope was extended to the EEZ of the respective contracting state.
267
 The 
idea behind this is that the money provided by the revised Brussels Convention is 
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mainly funded by public resources and should therefore only be used to compensate 
victims in the contracting states.
268
 
As already mentioned above, the Paris regime, including the PC and BC Protocol is 
only open to OECD member states, unless all contracting states agree to the admis-
sion of a non-OECD member state, as it was agreed on for Slovenia in 2001.
269
 Nei-
ther the PC Protocol nor the BC Protocol have yet entered into force,
270
 although 
several countries have already aligned their national legislation to the provisions of 
the revised Conventions (such as Germany). However, it can be assumed that the 
protocols will enter into force soon.
271
 
3.3.2.6 Assessment and outlook on the future of the conventions 
As illustrated above, the international nuclear liability system is based on two pillars, 
which are concurring, even though they represent the same core principles. The 
adoption of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation involved a third player, 
which perhaps was intended to connect the two systems, but indeed created a further 
competition between the liability regimes.
272
 The problem of the concurrent system 
is especially significant, when it comes to the use of public funds for compensation. 
The revised Brussels Convention therefore includes a progressive regulation in arti-
cle 14(d) revised Brussels Convention, which allows the contracting states to use the 
money from the public funds to satisfy obligations arising by virtue of other interna-




The future of these conventions is contentious. Suggestions were made for a univer-
sal system, which would cover all relevant states and provisions concerning nuclear 
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 but also for a convention dealing specifically with state responsibility in the 
context of nuclear liability.
275
 The latter approach was accused to be ineffective
276
 
and although the ideas were appreciated in general, they could not find enough sup-
port amongst the international community.
277
 
Apart from this, the provided international nuclear regimes remain imperfect.
 278
 
Three significant problems should be outlined. The first one is the required financial 
security of the nuclear operators. Despite the fact that it is desirable to increase the 
operators’ liability amounts, it remains unclear, if they are able to meet these re-
quirements.
279
 Generally, financial security is provided through appropriate insur-
ances. The insurers made several announcements that they would not be able to pro-
vide adequate insurances, such as for the full 30-year prescription duration, for the 
damages especially related to environmental damages and preventive measures or for 
risks arising from terrorist attacks.
280
 
A further problem is the question concerning on-site damages. These damages are 
excluded by all conventions due to the intention that the nuclear operator should not 
use the provided financial security for its own damages at the expense of third par-
ties.
281
 Although the argument is favourable, it poses the question if nuclear opera-
tors could claim for their own damages against negligent suppliers. While one view 
denies this with regard to the principle of exclusive liability of the operator, another 
view affirms the possibility of compensation. Its argument is that these kind of dam-
ages fall outside of the scope of the conventions, which makes them recoverable un-
der ordinary civil law.
282
 The conventions should clarify this question. 
Finally, the most distressing issue probably is the lack of contracting states to all 
conventions. Currently, by 2014 249 of 435 nuclear reactors were located in coun-
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tries, which are not party to any international nuclear liability agreement.
283
 South 
Africa is one of these countries. Some of the countries do not even provide any spe-
cific domestic legislation regarding nuclear liability, such as Pakistan or the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
284
 Nuclear incidents occurring in any of the non-convention states 
put victims, regardless of damage suffered inside or outside the country, in a precari-
ous situation in terms of claiming damages.
285
 They are left with issues regarding the 
principle right to sue compensation, but also with problems of burden of proof or the 
amount of available compensation, which is solved by the existing conventions.
286
 
One explanation for this irresponsibility is given by Schwartz, who suggests, that the 
system of ‘limited liability’, laid down in the nuclear liability regimes, might be a 
reason for countries not to join the regime, because they want to provide unlimited 
compensation for victims.
287
 The author of this study, who places the intentions of 
the non-contracting states more in the area of preventing liability and the lack of 
willingness to impose stricter regulations on the nuclear industry due to political rea-
sons highly doubts this argument. Furthermore, the system of ‘limited liability’ is 
more or less abrogated by the latest PC Protocol and the case of Germany shows that 
implementation of an unlimited liability regime is also possible within the Paris 
Convention system (see below). The last argument is also acknowledged by 
Schwartz.
288
 Further consistent reasons are the regional scope of the Conventions, 
especially the Paris regime, or if countries are geographically too remote to benefit 
from the liability regime.
289
 However, further incentives must be made for these 
countries to sign and ratify the conventions and protocols. This is only possible by 
accompanying states which are interested and helping them to adapt their domestic 
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Nevertheless, it will be interesting to examine in chapter 5 the intention and reasons 
of South Africa not adhering to any international nuclear liability agreement by as-
sessing its legal nuclear liability framework. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As seen above, the international framework of nuclear liability is an ongoing process. 
It reacts to events occurring related to nuclear liability. The reactions to the Cherno-
byl accident can illustratively be read from the development of the international nu-
clear liability regime. It will be interesting, how the international community will 
react to the Fukushima accident and to the further demand and establishment of nu-
clear energy reactors. This discussion is already conducted amongst legal scholars.
291
 
The findings to the classification of nuclear liability in international law and the in-
ternational principles of nuclear liability should be borne in mind for the following 
assessment of the domestic nuclear liability frameworks. 
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Chapter 4 – German nuclear liability regime 
4.1 Introduction 
Germany has always had and still has a special relationship with nuclear energy. 
When it comes to environmental movements in Germany, the first association is 
Greenpeace and its most important topic, the resistance to nuclear energy. In no other 
country was the environmental movement focused on the topic of the civilian use of 
nuclear energy to such an extent and for such a long period of time as in Germany.
292
 
This eternal dispute finally resulted in the decision of the German government to stop 
the nuclear energy programme after the Fukushima accident by taking the last two 
power plants from the grid by the end of 2022.
 293
 
However, not only this discussion has always been of significant interest for the in-
ternational nuclear community, but also the German nuclear liability framework has 
gathered particular attention, as it is outstanding by providing more or less the high-
est standards compared to other nuclear liability frameworks.
294
 Unlimited liability, 
an unlimited territorial scope and the highest financial security provisions of any 
Paris Convention state are part of the German nuclear liability framework.
295
 That 
makes it so interesting for a comparison with the South African legal framework for 
nuclear liability. 
Germany, as an OECD member state, is part of the Paris Convention system. For 
implementing the Paris Convention and its principles, it has chosen to adopt the con-
vention in its entirety. This means that instead of adopting a new domestic act, the 
German legislator transposed the text of the Paris Convention literally into binding 
German domestic law.
296
 Furthermore, it stretched the Paris Convention to its very 
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limits, by making use of all options and margins the system provides for the national 
legislators and by going beyond this with several reservations to the Convention.
297
 
The aim behind this approach is, firstly, to shift the above mentioned balance of the 
nuclear industry and the potential victims of a nuclear accident towards the latter 
ones and, secondly, to narrow the gap between ordinary law of delict and nuclear 
liability law as much as possible.
298
 
To get a better understanding of the German legal framework for nuclear liability and 
its structure, the study will give a brief overview about the history of German nuclear 
liability legislation, before outlining the elements of German nuclear liability law and 
assessing it. 
4.2 History of German nuclear liability 
The first regulations concerned with nuclear liability could be found in the Atomge-
setz
299
 (Atomic Energy Act) which was promulgated in 1959.
300
 It included a chapter 
dealing with liability issues, independent from the Paris Convention, which was 
adopted in 1960. A special feature was the channelling of liability in an economic 
manner to the operator, instead of a legal manner as in the Paris Convention. Fur-
thermore, the limit of liability was DM 500 million (approximately EUR 250 mil-
lion) then, which was far beyond the limit of the Paris Convention.
301
 As the 
Atomgesetz fitted much better in ordinary law of delict and provided a higher liability 
standard, huge discussions about the ratification of the Paris Convention erupted in 
Germany. However, Germany finally ratified the Paris Convention and the Brussels 
Convention in 1975 and transferred the wording of the Paris Convention literally into 
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 In this context, the German nuclear liability legislation was 
also brought in line with the provisions of the Paris Convention.
303
 The next im-
portant step was the abrogation of limited liability in 1985.
304
 Since this time the lia-
bility of nuclear operators is unlimited. In 1998, the national government was built 
by a coalition, which had a negative attitude against the use of nuclear energy. This 
culminated in the first legislation concerned with phasing-out of nuclear energy in 
2002.
305
 In the context of this amendment of the Atomgesetz, the maximum amount 
for financial security was raised to EUR 2.5 billion, paired with a new system to se-
cure the availability of this money, namely a pooling system.
306
 
The last important amendment was promulgated in 2008,
307
 in order to align the 
German legislation with the 2004 PC Protocol. The amendment will become effec-
tive, as soon as the PC Protocol will enter into force.
308
 Due to the fact that the cur-
rent German legislation already includes most of the amendments of the PC Protocol, 
its pending status does not have that much impact on Germany – compared to other 




4.3 Elements of German nuclear liability 
The German nuclear liability regime is based on two pillars, namely the Paris Con-
vention and the Atomgesetz, which supplements the Paris Convention. The Atomge-
setz thereby regulates issues, which are left to the discretion of the contracting states 
by the Paris Convention and even modifies the convention at particular points.
310
 
This will be outlined later. 
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The process of implementing the Paris Convention into German domestic law con-
sisted of the promulgation of an act of the Bundestag (German Parliament) in line 
with the Grundgesetz (German Constitution), which in fact includes the consent of 
the parliament to implement the Paris Convention and the original convention text of 
1960 plus the text of the amendment of 1964.
311
 Similar procedures took place for 
the amendment protocol of 1982
312
 and the PC Protocol of 2004,
313
 while the latter 
one is still pending.
314




Despite its self-executive character, the Paris Convention leaves options and margins 
for the contracting state, either deliberately to specify certain provisions, such as the 
amount of the liability limit, or to develop general aspects, such as the process for a 
claim for compensation.
316
 As there is no particular act for nuclear liability in Ger-
many, this task is undertaken by the Atomgesetz. Bearing in mind that the act was 
adopted in advance of the Paris Convention, the structure is not aligned to the con-
vention, which makes it more difficult to read both statutes alongside with each oth-
er.
317
 However, the most important sections concerning liability could be found in 
chapter 4 Haftungsvorschriften (liability provisions) and therein particular in the sec-
tions 25-40 Atomgesetz, paired with several other provisions in the act.
318
 The sup-
plementary character of the Atomgesetz could be read from section 25(1) Atomgesetz, 
which states that the provisions of the act apply complementary to the Paris Conven-
tion.
319
 Further cases of nuclear liability outside the Paris Convention system are 
regulated in section 25(a) Atomgesetz for nuclear ships and in section 26 Atomgesetz, 
which is a catch-all provisions for radiation-related damage.
320
 In terms of the out-
                                                 
311
 Bundesgesetzblatt 1975 II 957 
312
 Bundesgesetzblatt 1985 II 690 
313
 Bundesgesetzblatt 2008 II 902 
314




 N Pelzer ‘Conflicts of Laws Issues under the International Nuclear Liability Conventions’ in JF 
Baur et al. Festschrift für Gunther Kühne zum 70. Geburtstag (2009) 824-828; Raetzke op cit (n5) 12-
13 
317
 Raetzke op cit (n5) 13 
318
 G Kühne ‘Haftung bei grenzüberschreitenden Schäden aus Kernreaktorunfällen’ (1986) Neue Ju-
ristische Wochenschrift 2139; OECD & NEA op cit (n309) 20 
319
 Kühne op cit (n318) 2139; Raetzke op cit (n5) 13 
320
 OECD & NEA op cit (n309) 21; Raetzke op cit (n5) 13; Keich op cit (n310) 481 
41 
lined international nuclear liability regime it must be mentioned that Germany is also 
party to the Brussels Convention and the Joint Protocol.
321
 
Another important, but rather general act, which contains specific regulations con-
cerning the nature and extent of compensation is the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Ger-
man Civil Code),
322
 which will be covered in more detail later. 
4.3.1 Strict liability 
As mentioned above, article 3 and 4 Paris Convention impose strict liability on the 
operator of a nuclear installation. These provisions are unrestrictedly applicable in 
Germany.
323
 The concept of strict liability (in German: Gefährdungshaftung) is not 
alien to German civil law, as it has been an element of it since the 19
th
 century and 
was originally applicable for railway operators and later for other industrial sec-
tors.
324
 Furthermore, the concept of strict liability can be already found in the 
Atomgesetz 1959,
325




4.3.2 Exclusive liability 
The channelling of liability exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation 
could also be found in the German domestic law, as outlined in article 6 Paris Con-
vention.
327
 According to the Paris Convention the operator is thereby ‘the person 
designated or recognised by the competent public authority as the operator of that 
installation.’
328
 The expression ‘operator’ can be also found in section 17(6) Atomge-
setz. The provision stipulates that the licence authority must outline in any licence for 
the operation of a nuclear installation that ‘the licence holder is the operator as de-
fined by the [Paris Convention.]’
329
 The idea behind this provision is to bring the 
general German nuclear energy law in line with the provisions of the Paris Conven-
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tion. Insofar the term ‘operator’ is only used for formal purposes, while in reality the 
licence holder is the crucial and responsible person or company in Germany in terms 
of nuclear liability.
330
 This intention could be also read from section 25(2) Atomge-
setz, which – according to article 4(d) Paris Convention – allows the transmission of 
liability to a carrier, if he or she assumed the nuclear liability trough contraction.
331
 
In this case, the carrier is regarded as the operator of the nuclear installation.
332
 
As already outlined above, this exclusive legal liability approach was not part of 
German law before it ratified the Paris Convention; instead the Atomgesetz 1959 
provided the concept of economic channelling of liability.
333
 The first approach was 
to maintain this idea, which can be read from Germany’s reservation to the Paris 
Convention at the time of signature.
334
 The reservation states ‘the right to provide, by 
national law that persons other than the operator may continue to be liable for dam-
age caused by a nuclear incident.’
335
 In the following this intention was changed due 
to two main arguments. Firstly, the legal channelling of liability would be simpler 
and would prevent complicated cross liability of different entities. Secondly, it would 
also facilitate the sector of insurance, as only one person or company would be 
obliged to maintain liability insurance.
336
 Due to these arguments, Germany did not 
make use of its reservation by the time of ratification of the Paris Convention and 
abrogated the contradicting section in the Atomgesetz.
337
 
4.3.3 Exoneration of liability 
As mentioned above, the Paris Convention provides exonerations in several cases of 
liability in article 9 Paris Convention. This procedure is typically in strict liability 
regimes, especially for force majeure cases due to the extent of the liability.
338
 The 
exonerations of the Paris Convention include ‘an act of armed conflict, hostilities, 
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civil war, insurrection or (…) a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.’
339
 
Consequently, the liability in the case of the Fukushima accident would be excluded 
in terms of the Paris Convention.
340
 Nevertheless the category ‘grave natural disaster 
of an exceptional character’ was abrogated by the 2004 PC Protocol.
341
 
The German liability framework completely excludes these exonerations. According 
to section 25(3) Atomgesetz, the provision of article 9 Paris Convention is not appli-
cable in German law. The provision is secured by a reservation to the Paris Conven-
tion.
342
 This approach is quite untypical, as exonerations are usual for strict liability 
regimes,
343
 but then again it is a proof of the comprehensive German nuclear liability 
framework. 
However, the applicability of this provision is confined in two manners.
344
 If the 
damage occurs in another country, compensation is only provided, when the other 
country has a similar provision like section 25(3) Atomgesetz.
345
 Furthermore, in the 
cases of article 9 Paris Convention, the liability is limited to EUR 2.5 billion.
346
 
4.3.4 Damage to be compensated 
The damage to be compensated is defined by section 3(a) Paris Convention, which 
outlines the liability of the operator for ‘damage to or loss of life of any person’ and 
‘damage to or loss of any property’.
347
 As these terms are quite vague, they are fur-
ther developed by national legislation, particularly through section 28-30 Atomgesetz 
and in a non-nuclear-specific manner through the German Civil Code, the Bürgerli-
ches Gesetzbuch, which is supplemented and further defined by German legal litera-
ture and a wide variety of court judgments.
348
 The compensation regime of the Bür-
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gerliches Gesetzbuch includes the notion of full compensation
349
 and compensation 
for immaterial damage.
350
 Despite the fact that German law also covers consequen-
tial financial loss, purely financial loss could not be claimed under German law.
351
 
Furthermore, a provision for prioritisation of specific compensation, like in other 
member states of the Paris Convention, such as for the loss of life or personal injury 
does not exist in German law.
352
 
With article 1(a)(vii)(3)-(6) revised Paris Convention, further categories of nuclear 
damage are introduced in the international nuclear liability regime. In addition to the 
installation of consequential financial loss
353
 and compensation for preventive 
measures
354
, compensation for environmental damage is included in the revised Paris 
Convention. This compensation includes ‘the costs of measures of reinstatement of 
impaired environment’
355
 and ‘loss of income deriving from a direct economic inter-
est in any use or enjoyment of the environment’
356
. 
While the corresponding amendment in German law is silent about these new catego-
ries, the question arises how they should be implemented in the domestic law. The 
two categories of consequential financial loss and compensation for preventive 
measures are already covered by the general compensation provision of section 
249(1) Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
357
 Regarding the categories attached to environ-
mental damages, it would be the task of the German courts to examine, if the general 
rules of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch can be stretched to such an extent.
358
 In the 
opinion of Raetzke the German framework already includes these categories of dam-
age in its current legislation. His argumentation is based on the fact that nearly all 
parts of the environment in Germany are attached to persons by ownership or similar 
rights and, thus, these persons have a right to claim compensation. This approach is 
supported by the argumentation that the 2004 PC Protocol only introduced environ-
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mental damages under private law attributed to individual victims and precisely not 
the environment as a common asset of the general public.
359
 
Collectively, German law provides a comprehensive range of damages to be com-
pensated in accordance with the stipulations of the Paris Convention and the 2004 PC 
Protocol. The compensation for environmental damage must be highlighted in this 
context, although it does not include environment in a general sense, rather only in 
conjunction with damages of individuals. 
4.3.5 Nature and amount of liability 
The probably most interesting and unique tool of the German nuclear liability 
framework are the regulations concerning the amount of liability. 
4.3.5.1 General – the principle of unlimited liability 
As already mentioned above, Germany introduced the concept of unlimited liability 
in 1985 by rewriting section 31(1) Atomgesetz. The section nowadays simply out-
lines that the liability of the operator is unlimited.
360
 This means that the operator 
bears liability after all compensation possibilities, such as the mandatory financial 
security, state funds and the funds of the Brussels Convention, are exhausted until its 
insolvency.
361
 This provision is contradictory to the regulations of the Paris Conven-
tion, which stipulate a limited liability with a maximum amount of SDR 15 mil-
lion.
362
 This conflict was also considered by the drafters of the amendment of the 
Atomgesetz, but they interpreted the provisions of the Paris Convention in a broader 
way and not as irrefutable. Indeed, the provisions require more consistency between 
the amount of liability and the financial security.
363
 Due to this argumentation the 
unlimited liability was implemented in German law and the other contracting parties, 
even though they were not convinced, ultimately accepted the unlimited liability sys-
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tem in Germany as a fait accompli, which could not be changed anyway.
364
 This de-
cision by Germany could probably be seen as the door opener for a new development 




The decision was endorsed by several arguments. After the nuclear industry was de-
veloped and matured, one could not see a reason for still privileging the industry in 
contrast to ordinary law of delict.
366
 It was also recognized that a strict liability does 
not mandatorily entail limited liability.
367
 A further argument was derived from the 
most important court ruling of the German Constitutional Court concerning the use 
of nuclear energy. It states that through the provisions of the Atomgesetz, mainly sec-
tion 7(2) Atomgesetz,
368
 the licencing of a nuclear installation can only be permitted, 
if the risk of damages to life, health and property is practically excluded.
369
 Insofar it 
would be inconsistent, if the licence for a nuclear installation required practically no 
residual risks of damage, but at the same time the liability for such a theoretical risk 
should be limited.
370
 And finally, the concept of unlimited liability benefits potential 
victims of an accident.
371
 
However, this discussion will become redundant, when the 2004 PC Protocol will 
enter into force, which increases the minimum liability amount significantly to EUR 
700 million and does not stipulate anymore a maximum amount of liability,
372
 thus it 
includes the concept of unlimited liability. 
4.3.5.2 Damage outside of Germany – the principle of reciprocity 
The German liability provisions apply regardless of the place, thus they can be ap-
plied everywhere. This is stated by section 25(4) Atomgesetz, which coincidently 
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47 
declares article 2 Paris Convention as not applicable. Although this might sound 
quite excessive and suggests unlimited liability for people who suffered damage out-
side of Germany, the provision must be read together with section 31(2) Atomge-
setz.
373
 This provision restricts the concept of unlimited liability of section 31(1) 
Atomgesetz through installing a reciprocity clause, which limits the liability of a 
German operator for damage of victims located in another country to the amount that 
would be provided by the other country for German victims in the equal scenario.
374
 
Section 31(2) Atomgesetz thereby differentiates between three types of states. The 
first type of state also provides unlimited liability for German victims; in this case 
the foreign victims would benefit from the German unlimited liability.
375
 The second 
type of state (the majority of European states) has a limited liability regime in place 
for German victims; for victims from these states Germany provides the equal 
amount of compensation. It is significant in this context that resources from supple-
mentary funds, such as the Brussels Convention, are incorporated; hence the amount 
for contracting states of the Brussels Convention is at least SDR 300 million (EUR 
1.5 billion under the revised 2004 BC Protocol).
376
 Finally, the liability amount for 
victims from states without any nuclear installation is linked to the maximum amount 
of the Brussels Convention, actually SDR 300 million.
377
 
The introduction of this legislation was critically regarded by other contracting states 
with reference to the non-discrimination rule of article 14 Paris Convention. Howev-
er, the German government argued against these reservations with regard to the do ut 
des principle, which embodies an equal and non-discrimination treatment.
378
 In addi-
tion, despite the fact that the reciprocity clause limits the liability of German opera-
tors, they have to provide more compensation than their counterpart. Reasons for that 
are the lower threshold of the Brussels Convention, but also the fact that German 
operators have to compensate the full amount measured by section 31(2) Atomgesetz 
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for damage outside of Germany, while the potential German victims would only ben-
efit from a share of the already limited liability of the foreign operator.
379
 
4.3.6 Financially secured liability 
Due to the fact that the liability is only effective if it is sufficiently secured, the rele-
vant legislation requires financial liability cover.
380
 The Paris Convention therefore 
offers two possibilities: the maintenance of insurance or other financial security.
381
 
While normally the amount of financially secured liability is linked to the maximum 
amount of liability,
382
 a certain amount of financial security must be determined and 
even the revised Paris Convention stipulates for unlimited liability regime, the neces-
sity of the establishment of a limit of financial security provided by the operator.
383
 
The liability cover in Germany is regulated in section 13 Atomgesetz, which requires 
an amount of EUR 2.5 billion.
384
 The security system consists of a range of instru-
ments, consisting of mandatory insurance, other financial security in the form of the 
Solidarity Agreement, and – where necessary –  further state indemnification. 
The requirements for financial security are further outlined in the Atomrechtliche 
Deckungsvorsorge-Verordnung
385
 (Financial Security Ordinance), which was estab-
lished in accordance with section 13(3) Atomgesetz.
386
 It includes detailed regula-
tions about the determination of the financial security (by outlining both possibilities 
of mandatory insurance or other financial security
387
), which is established for every 
nuclear installation separately, while all commercial reactors in Germany reach the 
upper threshold of EUR 2.5 billion.
388
 The calculated amount is laid down in the nu-
clear licence and is reviewed every two years.
389
 The operators have to raise the fi-
nancial security and have to be able to demonstrate this, as otherwise the licence 
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 A further important provision stipulates that no direct legal 
action against the insurer is possible.
391
 
The financial security was originally covered by a special pooling system created by 
the German insurance sector, the Deutsche Kernreaktor Versicherungsgemeinschaft, 
(DKVG) in Cologne, founded in 1957.
392
 As the amount of financial cover was 
raised from DM 500 million (approximately EUR 256 million) to EUR 2.5 billion in 
2002, a new pooling system had to be established, because the new threshold was far 
beyond any insurance amount available on the market. This was realised through the 
already mentioned so called Solidarvereinbarung
393
 (Solidarity Agreement) between 
the four German energy providers, which operate all commercial nuclear power 
plants in Germany.
394
 The agreement establishes a two-tier system. The first tier en-
tails the existing insurance of EUR 256 million, while the second tier contains the 
residual amount of EUR 2.244 billion, provided by all four parties, composed 
through a specific calculation code according to their respective share of the reactors 
in Germany.
395
 In case of an accident, the energy providers have to contribute their 
share to compensation if the damage exceeds the mandatory insurance.
396
 Although 
there is no premium payable and payment obligations are only triggered in case of an 
accident,
397
 the availability of the money is secured through an annual certification, 
which secures the availability of the required sum.
398
 The establishment of this finan-
cial cover tool makes it possible to reach amounts for liability far beyond the capaci-
ty of the insurance sector, but it seems to be difficult to translate it into other regional 
or international pooling systems, as it requires a lot of cooperation between the par-
ties and similar safety standards.
399
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A further financial cover instrument is laid down in section 34 Atomgesetz. The pro-
vision regulates the providing of a supplementary state fund in form of a Freistel-
lungsverpflichtung (state indemnification).
400
 It releases an operator of its liability 
obligations upon an amount of EUR 2.5 billion if the compensation payable exceeds 
the financial cover or if the claim could not be answered by the financial cover.
401
 In 
other words, it fills the gap between the compensation available and the damage up-
on the amount of EUR 2.5 billion.
402
 In this context it is important that only the oper-
ator has a claim against the German state, while the victim does not.
403
 Scenarios in 
which the Freistellungsverpflichtung comes into effect are for example cases in 
which exclusion clauses in the insurance contracts are in place or cases of non-
compliance of an operator.
404
 However, since the Solidarvereinbarung is in place, 
which does not provide any exclusion clauses and where the liquidity is checked an-
nually, the importance of the Freistellungsverpflichtung has diminished, especially 
because it provides the same amount of EUR 2.5 billion as the Solidarverein-
barung.
405
 However, the Freistellungsverpflichtung falls under the requirement of a 




Furthermore, compensation could also be requested from the Brussels Convention. 
The problem hereby is that the German liability amounts exceed the thresholds of the 
tiers in the Brussels Convention. Due to this fact, the third tier of the Brussels Con-
vention is only triggered for Germany, if the compensation payable exceeds the 
amount of EUR 2.5 billion.
407
 For the revised Brussels Convention, this concept was 
abandoned. Article 9(c) revised Brussels Convention now stipulates that the third-tier 
funds shall be available, as soon as its threshold is triggered, irrespective if other 
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compensation is still available. This should prevent the punishment of states, which 
implement high liability amounts.
408
 
The last piece in terms of financial security is section 38 Atomgesetz. It provides ad-
ditional compensation for victims in Germany, who suffered damage from an acci-
dent, which occurred outside of Germany in a contracting state of the Paris Conven-
tion or the Vienna Convention in conjunction with the Joint Protocol, in case he or 
she does not obtain the same amount of compensation, as they would under German 
law.
409
 The provision is described as a gesetzliche Ausfallbürgschaft (statutory deficit 
guarantee)
410
 and aims to provide equal compensation for victims in Germany re-
gardless of which law is applicable.
411
 As the compensation is provided by the Ger-
man state, it is limited to the amount of EUR 2.5 billion, according to the state in-
demnification of section 34 Atomgesetz.
412
 In the cases of section 38 Atomgesetz, the 
victims have a direct claim against the German state.
413
 




4.3.7 Limited liability in time 
The limitation periods of article 8(a) Paris Convention (prescription or extinction 
after ten years) and the 2004 PC Protocol (extension to 30 years for claims regarding 
loss of life or personal injury)
415
 are surpassed by German law, which sets out a 30-
year period for all kinds of damage in section 32(1) Atomgesetz.
416
 Although such an 
extension is particularly permitted by article 8(a) Paris Convention, the German gov-
ernment secured its course of action through a reservation to the Paris Convention.
417
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A ‘discovery-rule’, as mentioned above, is also contained in German law and ex-
pressed by section 32 Atomgesetz.
418
 It states the limitation of liability claims to the 




The current German law does not include any special provision for the jurisdiction of 
a special court, which means that several courts would be competent according to the 
general provisions on jurisdiction.
420
 However, in line with the revised Paris Conven-
tion and the single court principle,
421
 the revised Atomgesetz will include a new sec-
tion 40(a), which assigns exclusive jurisdiction for nuclear damage to the Landger-
icht (regional court) in whose district the accident occurred.
422
 
4.4 Assessment and Conclusion 
The German nuclear liability regime is embedded in the framework of the Paris Con-
vention system, but modifies and refines it at the given options and margins in favour 
of the compensation of victims. The result of this attempt is a comprehensive and 
highly standardised nuclear liability regime, which tries to converge to the ordinary 
law of delict regime as closely as possible.
423
 Germany is also a pioneer in the matter 
of nuclear liability and several amendments of the 2004 PC Protocol can be traced 
back to the German nuclear legislation.
424
 Despite this exceptional character, several 
deficits remain. One has to go a little bit more into detail to find them. One disad-
vantage could be located in relation to the Fukushima accident. The actual Paris 
Convention still includes the exoneration of ‘a grave natural disaster of an exception-
al character.’
425
 Therefore, the liability remains limited to EUR 2.5 billion in the 
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 and if the damage is suffered outside of Germany, only is ap-
plicable if the other country provides an equal provision.
427
 
Furthermore, the Solidarvereinbarung is indeed theoretically applicable, but it will 
not be sufficient in practice, as nuclear damages can entail compensation claims of 
EUR 100 billion and more. For the case of a nuclear disaster, the capacity of the nu-
clear operators would not be adequate to cover further compensation claims beyond 
the Solidarvereinbarung. As these claims could not remain unpaid, the claims would 





, which determined the premium for a nuclear insurance, even 
came to the result for the expectable average amount for a nuclear accident in the 
amount of EUR 6.009 billion.
430
 They went beyond that and measured the premium 
of the insurance for different periods of the lifetime of the insurance, between ten and 
100 years. Based on the payable premiums, they had a look at the electricity prices as 
they wanted to find out if these costs could be spread on the electricity prices from 
nuclear energy. The result was that the prices would have to be increased between 
EUR 0.139 per kWh (for a lifetime of 100 years) and EUR 67.3 per kWh (for a life-
time of ten years).
431
 While even the first amount would mean a significant increase 
of the electricity prices and would make nuclear energy unprofitable, the second fig-
ure would not be payable at all. Thus they came to the result that the German energy 




A further deficit could be found in section 13(a) Paris Convention, which states that 
the courts of the country in whose territory the nuclear accident occurred are compe-
tent. This is fully applicable in Germany and is also reflected generally by the Ger-
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man legislation of liability for environmental damages.
433
 This regulation is a disad-
vantage for foreign victims, as they are not able to bring claims to court in their own 
language. A solution, which allows claims also at the places, where the damage was 
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Chapter 5 – South African nuclear liability regime 
5.1 Introduction 
Nuclear energy is not only used in developed countries, it is also popular in more 
developing countries, such as South Africa. The country has already two operational 
reactors, both located in Koeberg in the Western Cape.
435
 Furthermore, the govern-
ment is busy with expanding its nuclear energy programme. It recently signed a con-
tract with the Russian enterprise Rosatom about the building of a range of reactors 
with a total capacity of 9.6 GW.
436
 Although this agreement was suspended by the 
Western Cape High Court due to administrative law reasons,
437
 the further develop-
ment of nuclear energy in South Africa will not be stopped. Recently, the Depart-
ment of Environmental Affairs granted the environmental authorisation for a nuclear 
power plant at Duynefontein in the Western Cape.
438
 Due to this new development it 
is worth having a look on the nuclear liability regulation of South Africa and their 
performance in comparison with the international regime and the high standard re-
gime in Germany. 
Nuclear energy is regulated by three different acts in South Africa: the Nuclear Ener-
gy Act
439
 (NEA) and the National Nuclear Regulator Act
440
 (NNRA), which together 
replaced the old Nuclear Energy Act
441
 (NEA 1993), and the National Radioactive 
Waste Disposal Institute Act
442
 (NRWDIA). While the NEA is more concerned 
about general topics of nuclear energy, such as the establishment of a Nuclear Ener-
gy Corporation Limited, the dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
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 and the possession and export / import of nuclear fuel, the NNRA 
mainly deals with the regulation of nuclear activities and safety standards.
444
 The 
NRWDIA lastly deals with the bigger topic of nuclear waste management.
445
 
5.2 History of South African nuclear liability 
The history of the use of nuclear energy in South Africa can be traced back to the 
1960s, when South Africa started the research for a commercial nuclear power 
plant.
446
 South Africa was a producer of uranium, mainly as a by-product of the rich 
gold mines in the Witwatersrand
447
 and exported it to Britain and the USA from the 
1950s on for the construction of their nuclear weapons.
448
 As the export to Britain 
and the USA got stuck in 1964, the mining industry and the nuclear researchers 
called for an own nuclear energy programme and the building of a nuclear power 
plant.
449
 As a country with massive coal resources, the development of a nuclear 
power plant could be only envisaged in a place far away from the coal fields. Thus 
the decision fell on the Western Cape. Due to this consideration and with the oil cri-
sis of 1973 / 1974, which made it possible to justify the costs for the development of 
a nuclear power plant, the first, and until today the only South African nuclear power 
plant was built in Koeberg in the Western Cape.
450
 The first reactor unit finally got 
on the grid in September 1984, followed by the second unit a year later.
451
 
With the operation of two nuclear reactors, there was the need to establish related 
legislation. Hence the first Nuclear Energy Act
452
 (NEA 1982) was adopted in 1982, 
which stipulated the establishment of a Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) as a regu-
latory agency,
453
 which was finally founded in 1988.
454
 The CNS was also integrated 
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in the NEA 1993
455
 by awarding it with several functions, such as the granting of 
nuclear licences,
456
 and thereby it asserted more regulatory authority and independ-
ence.
457
 With the rewriting of South Africa’s nuclear legislation, the regulatory regu-
lations were set out in the NNRA and the CNS was replaced by the National Nuclear 
Regulator (NNR), which inherited most of its functions.
458
 The NNR is governed by 
a Board of Directors,
459
 which is also concerned with nuclear liability matters.
460
 
Provisions regarding nuclear liability were already established in the NEA 1993. 
However, this took place in a rudimental and partial way.
461
 With the establishment 
of the NNRA, which was adopted as a separate act apart from the NEA due to the 
reason that the sectors of nuclear safety and the sector of development of nuclear 
technologies should be separated,
462
 the provisions for nuclear liability were en-
hanced and bundled. They are now laid down in chapter 4 of the NNRA, more pre-
cisely in sections 29-35 NNRA. 
5.3 Elements of South African nuclear liability 
The nuclear liability regime in the sections 29-35 NNRA is orientated to the nuclear 
liability principles worked out in chapter 3.3.1, even though South Africa is not a 
contracting state to any of the outlined international conventions.
463
 The features of 
South Africa’s nuclear liability legislation are outlined in the following, before they 
are assessed against the international and the German nuclear liability framework. 
The special provisions concerning the liability for nuclear vessels in section 31 
NNRA, similar to section 25a Atomgesetz in Germany, and the provisions for the 
compensation of the Regulator’s employees in section 35 NNRA are not dealt with in 
further detail, as they are not part of the general international nuclear liability regime 
and their assessment would go beyond the scope of this study. 
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5.3.1 Strict liability 
The most significant principle of nuclear liability, strict liability, is reflected in the 
South African legislation.
464
 Section 30(1) NNRA stipulates that the holder of a nu-
clear installation licence is liable for nuclear damage, irrespective of intent or negli-
gence.
465
 In accordance with the international provisions, the strict liability refers to 
both incidents on a nuclear installation site
466
 and incidents during a transport under 
the responsibility of the licence holder.
467
 The NNRA further provides a specific 
provision for persons, who conduct actions without a nuclear installation licence, 
which normally would require one. These persons are strictly liable in the same way 
as a holder of a licence.
468
 Such a provision is neither contained in the international 
nor in the German legislation. 
5.3.2 Exclusive liability 
Section 30(1) NNRA also includes the principle of channelling liability to the holder 
of a nuclear installation licence,
469
 which can be read from the expression that ‘only’ 
the holder is liable for ‘all’ nuclear damage.
470
 Consequently it is striking that the 
South African legislation does not include the word ‘operator’ in contrast to the in-
ternational conventions and the German legislation, although the German and the 
South African legislation hold the same entity liable, the licence holder.
471
 The rea-
son why could be the fact that the German legislation had to bring its legislation in 
line with the international regulations, while the South African legislation is not re-
quired to clarify this due to the lack of any international convention membership. 
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5.3.3 Exoneration of liability 
Besides the general scope of the nuclear liability provisions, which exonerates nucle-
ar mage occurring on the nuclear installation site
472
 and which is also laid down in 
the international and German legislation, and the regulations for contributory negli-
gence,
473




5.3.4 Damage to be compensated 
The licence holder is liable for nuclear damage according to section 30(1) NNRA. 
The term is further defined in the definition section as 
‘(a) any injury to or the death or any sickness or disease of a person; or 
 (b) other damage, including any damage to or any loss of use of property or 
damage to the environment.’
475
 
Therefore, the South African legislation includes the general damage categories con-
cerning personal property damages, such as the recent international conventions.
476
 It 
even provides for compensation of damage to the environment, even though the term 
is not further defined. A definition for ‘environment’, like in the Mineral and Petro-
leum Resources Development Act
477
 (MPRDA) with references to the definition of 
National Environmental Management Act
478
 (NEMA) is missing,
479
 as well as a fur-




5.3.5 Nature and amount of liability 
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Section 30(2) NNRA stipulates the nature of liability. It states that liability of the 
holder of a nuclear installation licence is limited
481
 and, thus, reflects the general 
nuclear liability principle of limited liability. The amount of liability is congruent 
with the financial security, which must be provided by the licence holder according 
to section 29(2) NNRA.
482
 Thus, it reflects the principle of congruent financial secu-
rity. Another section concerned with the amount of liability is section 32(1) NNRA, 
which stipulates that the liability of a holder of a certificate of registration must be 
determined in line with the common law and the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act.
483
 This section explicitly refers to the holder of a certifi-
cate of registration, which is referred to in section 22 NNRA. Such a certificate is 
needed for actions, which can cause nuclear damage other than for actions on nuclear 
installation sites.
484
 Insofar the provision does not refer to holders of nuclear installa-
tion licences and therefore is not applicable.
485
 This argumentation is supported by 
the NNRA, which distinguishes between application for a nuclear installation licence 
(section 21 NNRA) and the application for a certificate of registration (section 22 
NNRA). Furthermore, the distinction also makes sense, as it is important to provide 
clear determined statutory provisions for major risks of large nuclear damages from 
nuclear installations, while the common law could provide more flexible and better 
fitting solutions for a lot more and different actions with a lower risk profile. 
5.3.6 Financially secured liability 
The South African legislation also stipulates the obligation of a mandatory financial 
security for the liability obligations of a nuclear installation in section 29(1) & (2) 
NNRA, in accordance with the amount of limited liability.
486
 The Minister of Energy 
is assigned to determine the amount of financial security in accordance with the 
Board of Directors.
487
 Therefore, the Minister has to determine categories of nuclear 
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installations and amounts of financial security for the individual categories.
488
 The 




5.3.6.1 NNRA Regulations concerning financial security 
These stipulations were implemented with the enactment of regulations in 2004
490
 
(NNRA-REG). The sole nuclear power plant in Koeberg is classified as a category 1 
installation,
491
 for which a financial security of R 2.4 billion must be provided.
492
 
While the Safari-1 Research Reactor is a category 2 installation
493
 with a financial 
security level of R 120 million,
494
 the Vaalputs National Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Facility is classified in category 3
495
 with a financial security level of R 1 million.
496
 




Although the general principles of international nuclear liability are reflected in this 
context by the South African legislation, the amount of liability and financial security 
is far beyond the current international standards.
498
 This lack was also recognized by 
the NNR, which reviewed the levels of financial security and recommended the in-
crease of the amounts to the Minister of Energy.
499
 In this context, a government 
notice was recently published for public comments on the amendment of the men-
tioned regulations concerning the liability amount and financial security.
500
 This new 
proposed NNRA-REG would upgrade the nuclear liability framework in several 
points. 
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Firstly, the proposed NNRA-REG do not only categorize the several nuclear installa-
tions in South Africa, but they also provide for requirements and criteria for the dif-
ferent categories;
501
 for example a reactor with a thermal power level of more than 
100 MW is classified as a category 1 installation.
502
 This provision would be a great 
advantage in terms of transparency and legal certainty, as it sets out a general set of 
rules for the classification of nuclear installation. The provisions would concretise 
the indefinite section 29(1) NNRA, which is so far the basis for the classification and 
which only states that it is up to the Minister of Energy to categorise the nuclear in-
stallations. 
Secondly, the most important amendment is the increase of the financial security 
levels and at the same time the amount of liability. The amounts are raised for cate-
gory 1 installations to SDR 367 million,
503
 for category 2 installations to SDR 44 
million
504
 and for category 3 installations to SDR 3 million.
505
 Besides the fact that 
this amendment would constitute a huge increase of liability and financial cover,
506
 
the conversion from Rand to SDR, in accordance with the international conventions, 
entails more continuity and security of financial liquidity, irrespective the potential 
uncertainty of the currency. Furthermore, the proposed NNRA-REG stipulate the 
annually review of the financial security.
507
 This is important, as it clarifies the vague 
and confusing section 29(5) NNRA and further stipulates the alignment of the pro-
vided financial security with the financial requirements of section 4(1) proposed 
NNRA-REG if the exchange rate fluctuates.
508
 The idea of independence from the 
exchange rate and, thus, a higher level of liability and financial security is clearly 
expressed in this section. 
5.3.6.2 State indemnification 
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In accordance to the German nuclear liability regime, the South African legislation 
also provides for some kind of state indemnification. While the regulations in Ger-
many are very clear and linked to special amounts of compensation,
509
 the stipula-
tions in section 33 NNRA are very vague. The section stipulates that the holder of a 
nuclear installation licence has to inform the Minister of Energy, when claims for 
nuclear damage against him or her exceed the amount of his or her financial securi-
ty.
510
 In such a case, the parliament must be informed and must decide whether the 
state covers the claims for compensation exceeding the liability of the licence hold-
er.
511
 In general such a provision is useful for the benefit of victims, however in the 
South African legislation it is not explicit enough. The provision should stipulate that 
the state is obligated to provide for additional financial compensation. It should be 
further stated upon which amount the state is obligated, as otherwise the provision 
does not have a real value for victims. 
5.3.7 Limited liability in time 
The liability of the holder of a nuclear installation licence is not only limited in 
amount, but also in time stated in section 34 NNRA.
512
 This provision could be re-
garded as very progressive, as it stipulates a prescription period of 30 years for all 
kinds of nuclear damage, irrespective the kind of damage.
513
 Furthermore, the legis-
lation also provides for a ‘discovery rule’ of two years in section 34(2) NNRA. 
5.3.8 Jurisdiction 
As South Africa is not a contracting state to any of the international conventions on 
nuclear liability, the question of the competent jurisdiction does not arise. Although 
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5.4 Comparative assessment 
The discussion of the several nuclear liability elements in the South African legisla-
tion shows that in general the international principles worked out in chapter 3.3.1 are 
reflected and implemented in the legislation.
515
 Particularly it stipulates a strict and 
exclusive liability regime, which limits the liability to a certain amount and in time. 
In addition, the principle of congruent financial security is also laid down in the 
South African legislation. 
5.4.1 Progressive provisions 
In comparison with the international framework, the regulation of exonerations is 
outstanding. While all international conventions include exonerations,
516
 especially 
for force majeure events, the South African legislation is silent on them. With re-
gards to the Fukushima accident, the Paris Convention system would not have been 
applicable, as it still includes the exoneration of a grave natural disaster until the 
2004 PC Protocol enters into force.
517
 Even the German legislation, which is regard-
ed as very progressive and comprehensive, abrogated all exonerations, but provides 
only limited liability in force majeure events.
518
 This is especially unfortunate, as the 
extent of nuclear damage caused by a force majeure event is potentially very exten-
sive. Compared to these two legal systems, the South African approach is the most 
progressive one,
519
 as it includes no exonerations and thus it does not stipulate any 
exception rules in case of a force majeure event. 
A further provision, which can be highlighted is section 34(1) NNRA, which codifies 
a prescription period of 30 years, irrespective of the nature of damage. It includes 
personal damages, as well as property and environmental damage. Bearing in mind 
that the international framework, which extended the time limit for personal injury 
and loss of life to 30 years only in the VC Protocol
520
 and the PC Protocol,
521
 this is 
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 Therefore, the South African nuclear liability regime is on the 
same level as the German nuclear liability regime, which also stipulates a prescrip-
tion period of 30 years for all kind of damages.
523
 The recommendation to reduce the 
time limit for damages other than personal injury and loss of life,
524
 should not be 
followed, the high standard should rather be maintained for the benefit of the victims 
and the environment. 
Another progressive provision with further potential is found at the beginning of the 
NNRA. Besides the standard damage categories the definition of nuclear damage, 
section 1(xv) NNRA, also includes the category of damage to the environment. 
While the international framework has recently expanded its damage categories, in-
cluding damage related to environment,
525
 the German nuclear legislation does not 
include any such provision and only refers to the international provisions.
526
 None of 
them include such a clear statement to environmental damage in general. However, it 
would be important to further define the term environment to attribute more value to 
this damage category, such as in the MPRDA with reference to the definition of envi-
ronment in NEMA.
527
 It would be desirable to include preventive measures
528
 and in 
general a more detailed and structured categorization of damage categories in ac-
cordance with the international framework is desirable.
529
 Presuming that the term 
‘environmental damage’ in the NNRA is in line with the definition of NEMA, a sig-
nificant difference emerges. As examined in chapter 4.3.4 the German legislation 
does only provide for compensation of environmental damage, if the environment is 
attributed to a person,
530
 the definition of NEMA includes a more holistic approach 
of definition of environment. This is further supported by the environmental right of 
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Despite these positive and progressive provisions in the South African nuclear legis-
lation, it also shows several deficits, which will be outlined. 
5.4.2.1 No party to any international nuclear liability convention 
South Africa is currently not a state party to any international nuclear liability con-
vention,
532
 nevertheless it is an IAEA member since the early beginning in 1957
533
 
and has signed several conventions regarding nuclear energy, such as the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety.
534
 Besides the fact that South Africa should join the international 
nuclear liability convention system due to its general international responsibility as a 
nuclear country,
535
 a membership would bring a lot of advantages.
536
 Therefore, the 
accession to one of the conventions is highly recommended.
537
 As a non-European 
country and non-OECD member, the accession to the Vienna Convention, the Con-
vention on Supplementary Compensation or both would be the best choice.
538
 In the 
opinion of the author of this study, signing the Convention on Supplementary Com-
pensation would be the first and easiest step to join the international convention sys-
tem, as this Convention allows for the greatest freedom. This is because the Conven-
tion on Supplementary Compensation, which has the potential of a global nuclear 
liability regime,
539
 only requires to be in line with the principles set out in the annex 
of the convention from contracting states.
540
 Right now South Africa’s legislation 
generally is in line with these stipulations and only minor adjustments would be re-
quired in order to be able to join the convention.
541
 
The advantages of such a membership include the applicability of the exclusive ju-
risdiction principle, which assigns the jurisdiction to only one particular court and 
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 In addition it would be easier to recognise and enforce 
judgments of other member countries.
543
 Moreover, the implementation of the re-
quired principles would establish a liability and compensation regime with a high 
level of certainty and predictability.
544
 Finally, South Africa would benefit from the 
additional international fund, which is provided by all contracting states up to an 
amount of approximately SDR 300 million.
545
 However, it could be a burden for 
South Africa that compensation would have to be paid to a larger circle of people, 
but this risk is manageable, especially as no other country close to South Africa is a 
contracting state,
546
 and the convention explicitly allows limiting the scope of liabil-
ity to damages in contracting states.
547
 
In the light of these predominant advantages, the questions arises why South Africa 
has not joined the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. One reason could 
be the remote geographical location of South Africa,
548
 as there is no other nuclear 
industry state around them.
549
 Another reason could be the general requirements of 
the convention regarding the nuclear liability provisions and the fund requirements 
especially.
550
 However, if looking closer, the requirements are not as tough as they 
are at first sight. Even though the convention requires the availability of at least SDR 
300 million for compensation on the national level,
551
 it does not stipulate on what 
basis the availability of the amount is ensured.
552
 It even provides for the possibility 
to split the amount between the operator and a public fund.
553
 Regarding the interna-
tional fund, it is important to outline that the states do not have to provide any fund 
in advance, they have to contribute only in case the additional fund is needed, for 
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example in the case of nuclear damage exceeds the national compensation amount 
provided by a contracting state.
554
 Furthermore, the contributions are mainly divided 
on the basis of the contracting states’ nuclear capacity.
555
 South Africa’s share would 
therefore be rather small,
556
 which must be weighed against the potential benefit 
from the international fund in case of an accident in South Africa.
557
 
In the light of this argumentation, it would be more than important for South Africa 
to join at least the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. As outlined, it 
would have many advantages and the burden and requirements are not high, especial-
ly as South Africa already meets most of them. This should also be considered in 
terms of the international responsibility as a nuclear industry, especially since the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. In this context it is not sufficient to be only an 
IAEA member and party to several agreements of nuclear energy and safety is-
sues,
558
 the responsibility rather entails to also be part of the international nuclear 
liability regime. 
5.4.2.2 Amount of liability and financial security provisions 
The requirements of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation lead to anoth-
er area of deficit. Presently – in December 2017 – the provisions concerning the lia-
bility amount for compensation and the system of financial security are quite 
weak.
559
 One reason is the low liability amount and the accompanied requirement for 
financial security, but the provisions are also too uncertain and unpredictable. The 
current liability amount for a nuclear power plant is R 2.4 billion,
560
 which is much 
lower than the required SDR 300 million of the Convention on Supplementary Com-
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 Furthermore, the categorization of the nuclear installation and the de-
termination of a liability amount are mainly left to the discretion of the Minister of 
Energy. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Minister also appoints the Board 
of the NNR.
562
 In comparison, in Germany all crucial provisions concerning the 
amount liability and financial security are included in the legislation.
563
 The legisla-
tion only assigns the right to regulate specific details of the financial security to the 
government, which it implemented through the Financial Security Ordinance.
564
 
The proposed NNRA-REG, which are not yet in force, could provide certain im-
provements. Raising the liability amount to SDR 367 million for a nuclear power 
plant
565
 is mandatory if South Africa wants to join an international convention. The 
conversion to SDR is also welcome, as it could provide more predictability irrespec-
tive of any exchange fluctuations. Furthermore, the establishment of categories for 
nuclear installations with certain criteria,
566
 instead of just categorising the existing 
nuclear installations,
567
 is a step in the right direction. However, this task is still left 
to the discretion of the Minister of Energy. It would be preferable if the criteria for 
the categories would be determined by an act of parliament. Furthermore, the provi-
sion of different categories about different kinds of nuclear installations is doubtful 
in general, as neither the international framework nor the German legislation in-
cludes such a distinction of nuclear installations.
568
 
Another vague provision is section 33 NNRA, which is concerned with additional 
funds for claims exceeding the maximum liability. The question if and to what extent 
additional financial means are provided should be determined by the parliament for 
every single case.
569
 Such a provision includes a high level of uncertainty, regardless 
of the fact that the parliament is involved in the decision. A state indemnification 
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regulation as in the German legislation, which includes certain provisions for the 
trigger of the public fund and a maximum amount,
570
 would be preferable and more 
predictable for all parties involved. It could also be used in terms of international 
conventions, which require the availability of public funds in a certain amount. 
As this argumentation has shown these provisions should be refined. The recent ap-
proaches are a good start, but it is also crucial to rework the provision concerning 
state indemnification.
571
 Otherwise a nuclear accident would mainly be at the ex-
pense of the victims and the tax payers. In addition, the discretion of the Minister of 
Energy should be reconsidered. If the competence stays with the Department of En-
ergy, certain safeguards should be incorporated in the legislation, which would allow 
the parliament to monitor the work of the Minister. 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
Although people might think, nuclear energy is a rather clean and safe way of pro-
ducing energy,
572
 the recent accidents have vividly showed the massive risk of this 
technology. If an accident at the scale of Chernobyl occurred at the Koeberg site, 
huge detrimental effects to Cape Town and the Peninsula would ensue. Besides the 
fact that four million inhabitants would have to be resettled, the whole tourist, manu-
facture and agricultural sector would be destroyed and the unique Cape floral king-
dom would be contaminated.
573
 Considering these dimensions, one has to 
acknowledge that an effective nuclear liability regime is crucial to be prepared for 
such a worst case scenario. Therefore, it was the scope of the study to examine and 
compare the South African nuclear liability legislation to the international framework 
and the German legislation. 
All three frameworks are far from perfect aand struggle with certain issues. While 
the biggest problem of the international framework is the lack of contracting 
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 the German legislation is a model for a comprehensive nuclear liability re-
gime with minor weaknesses. However, according to certain studies the amount of 
financial security provided in the German legislation is still not adequate compared 
to the extent of a potential accident.
575
 
Comparing the South African legislation with the two latter ones, the most striking 
issue is the fact that South Africa is not a contracting state of any international nucle-
ar liability convention. Although its legislation is in general aligned to international 
principles
576
 and the suitability of various conventions was already reviewed in 
2010,
577
 South Africa has not signed any convention. Such an accession would also 
help to improve the deficits of the existing legislation, which consists mainly of pro-
visions, which are too uncertain and unpredictable and leave too much discretion to 
the Minister of Energy. 
In accordance with the IAEA,
578
 the study therefore recommends to join the relevant 
international nuclear liability conventions. The Convention on Supplementary Com-
pensation could be a start, as it does not require as much adjustment as the Vienna 
Convention and its scope is limited to contracting states.
579
 However, Germany’s 
approach to implement the relevant convention literally into the domestic law and, 
thus, making it directly applicable, would be an idea to consider. Such a solution 
would save the long process of aligning all the domestic legislation and, thus, the 
South African government could be sure to have a well-developed and mature nucle-
ar liability regime in place. Such considerations are highly recommended before ex-
panding the existing nuclear liability regime. 
Bearing in mind the findings in the German legislation chapter and financial security 
cover, the general profitability of nuclear energy should be reconsidered. Although 
all the amounts of liability and financial security have been increased, they are still 
                                                 
574
 by 2014 249 of 435 nuclear reactors (57 per cent) were still not covered by any international nucle-
ar liability convention, see Davies op cit (n6); this figure is not up to date, as especially the USA and 
Japan have recently joined the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
575
 see chapter 4.4 
576
 Davies op cit (n6) 35 
577
 IAEA op cit (n532) 29 
578
 IAEA op cit (n532) 29 
579
 see chapter 3.3.2.4 
72 
not sufficient, neither in the progressive German framework nor in the international 
convention or in the South African legislation. Bearing in mind these huge potential 
costs and the insurances, which would have to be maintained, the promotion of nu-
clear energy as a cheap energy resource, especially in South Africa, must be consid-
ered quite critically. Statements like  
‘[n]uclear is very expensive to build but once you’ve paid it off, the plant lasts 60 
years versus 25 to 50 years for coal. Koeberg is Eskom’s cash cow because it’s paid 
off and costs very little to run’
580
 
from the former CEO of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, Dr Rob Ad-
am, must be confronted with the findings of the examined study.
581
 If the real risks 
and costs of the production of nuclear energy are taken into account, nuclear energy 
is an unprofitable nuclear resource. Countries should not make the mistake to exploit 
their insufficient legal frameworks to use cheap, but dangerous energy at the expense 
of the health of their people and their environment.  
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